Parrondo's paradox via redistribution of wealth by Ethier, S. N. & Lee, Jiyeon
ar
X
iv
:1
10
9.
44
54
v1
  [
ma
th.
PR
]  
21
 Se
p 2
01
1
Parrondo’s paradox via redistribution of wealth
S. N. Ethier∗
University of Utah
Department of Mathematics
155 S. 1400 E., JWB 233
Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA
e-mail: ethier@math.utah.edu
Jiyeon Lee†
Yeungnam University
Department of Statistics
214-1 Daedong, Kyeongsan
Kyeongbuk 712-749, South Korea
e-mail: leejy@yu.ac.kr
Sept. 20, 2011
Abstract
Toral (2002) considered an ensemble of N ≥ 2 players. In game B a
player is randomly selected to play Parrondo’s original capital-dependent
game. In game A′ two players are randomly selected without replacement,
and the first transfers one unit of capital to the second. Game A′ is fair
(with respect to total capital), game B is losing (or fair), and the random
mixture γA′ + (1 − γ)B is winning, as was demonstrated by Toral for
γ = 1/2 using computer simulation. We prove this, establishing a strong
law of large numbers and a central limit theorem for the sequence of
profits of the ensemble of players for each γ ∈ (0, 1). We do the same
for the nonrandom pattern of games (A′)rBs for all integers r, s ≥ 1.
An unexpected relationship between the random-mixture case and the
nonrandom-pattern case occurs in the limit as N →∞.
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1 Introduction
The original Parrondo (1996) games can be described in terms of probabilities
p := 1/2− ε and
p0 :=
1
10
− ε, p1 = p2 := 3
4
− ε, (1)
where ε > 0 is a small bias parameter (less than 1/10, of course). In game A,
the player tosses a p-coin (i.e., p is the probability of heads). In game B, if the
player’s current capital is congruent to j (mod 3), he tosses a pj-coin. (Assume
initial capital 0 for simplicity.) In both games, the player wins one unit with
heads and loses one unit with tails.
It can be shown that games A and B are both losing games (asymptotically),
regardless of ε, whereas the random mixture (1/2)(A + B) (toss a fair coin
to determine which game to play) is a winning game for ε sufficiently small.
Furthermore, certain nonrandom patterns, including AAB, ABB, and AABB
but excluding AB, are winning as well, again for ε sufficiently small. These are
the original examples of Parrondo’s paradox.
It has been suggested that game A acts as “noise” to break up the losing
cycles of game B played alone (Kay and Johnson 2003). Toral (2002) proposed
a stochastic model in which a different type of noise appears to have a similar
effect. The model assumes an ensemble of N ≥ 2 players and replaces the noise
effect of Parrondo’s game A by a redistribution of capital among the players. A
player i is selected at random to play. With probability 1/2 he can either play
Parrondo’s game B or game A′ consisting in that player giving away one unit of
his capital to a randomly selected (without replacement) player j. Notice that
this new game A′ is fair since it does not modify the total amount of capital, it
simply redistributes it randomly among the players.
Toral showed by computer simulation that the Parrondo effect is present in
his games. Our aim here is to prove this, establishing a strong law of large
numbers and a central limit theorem for the sequence of profits of the ensem-
ble of N players. For this we apply results of Ethier and Lee (2009), but the
application is not straightforward. For example, the formulas for the mean and
variance parameters in the central limit theorem depend on the unique station-
ary distribution of the underlying Markov chain as well as on its fundamental
matrix, both of which are too complicated to derive explicitly except for small
N . Nevertheless, we can evaluate the mean and variance parameters for all N .
We generalize (1) to the parameterization of Ethier and Lee (2009):
p0 :=
ρ2
1 + ρ2
− ε, p1 = p2 := 1
1 + ρ
− ε, (2)
where ρ > 0 (eq. (1) is the special case ρ = 1/3). The bias parameter is not
important, so we take ε = 0 in most of what follows, which makes game B fair
(asymptotically).
Let us summarize our results. Just as it is conventional in the literature to
denote the nonrandom pattern (A′)rBs by [r, s], we will introduce the (slightly
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redundant) notation (γ, 1 − γ) for the random mixture γA′ + (1 − γ)B. We
establish a strong law of large numbers (SLLN) and a central limit theorem
(CLT) for the sequence of profits of the ensemble of N players in both set-
tings (random mixture and nonrandom pattern). We provide a formula for the
random-mixture mean µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ), which does not depend on N , as a function of
γ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ > 0. The nonrandom-pattern mean µ(N)[r,s] does depend on N and
is rather more complicated; we provide a formula, as a function of N ≥ 2 and
ρ > 0, only for small r, s ≥ 1 but we determine its sign for all r, s ≥ 1, N ≥ 2,
and ρ > 0, thereby establishing necessary and sufficient conditions for the Par-
rondo effect to be present. Finally we show that the random-mixture case and
the nonrandom-pattern case are connected by the unexpected relationship
µ
(N)
(r/(r+s),s/(r+s)) = limM→∞
µ
(M)
[r,s] , r, s ≥ 1, N ≥ 2, ρ > 0, (3)
and a simple formula for this common value is provided. To put this in perspec-
tive, the corresponding identity for one-player Parrondo games fails in all but
one case (r = 2, s = 1).
The variance parameter is considerably more complicated, so we assume
that ρ = 1/3 (i.e., (1) holds with ε = 0) and γ = 1/2, obtaining a formula
for (σ
(N)
(1/2,1/2))
2 as a function of N ≥ 2. We do the same for (σ(N)[r,s])2 for ρ =
1/3 and small r, s ≥ 1. It turns out that the analogue of (3) fails for the
variances. However, a different notion of variance, the expected sample variance
of the individual players’ capitals, which was considered by Toral (2002), does
apparently satisfy a relationship nearly analogous to (3). We can confirm this
only in special cases, so it remains a conjecture.
Toral (2002) also studied a model in which the capital-dependent game is
replaced by a history-dependent game. It seems likely that most of the results
of this paper can be extended to that setting, with the probable exception
of Theorem 7 below. Finally, Toral considered a model with redistribution
of wealth from richer to poorer neighbors. That model is considerably more
difficult to analyze than either of the others, and no rigorous results for it are
known.
2 Mean profit for random mixtures
There are two natural ways to define the model. The simplest is to describe the
state of the system by an N -dimensional vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) in which
xi denotes the capital (mod 3) of player i. An alternative approach (adopted by
Ethier 2007), which makes the state space smaller but the one-step transition
probabilities more complicated, is to describe the state of the system, when it is
in state x according to the previous description, by (n0, n1, n2), where n0 (resp.,
n1, n2) is the number of 0s (resp., 1s, 2s) among x1, x2, . . . , xN . Using the first
approach, the state space is
ΣN := {x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) : xi ∈ {0, 1, 2} for i = 1, . . . , N} = {0, 1, 2}N ,
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while using the second approach, the state space is
Σ¯N := {(n0, n1, n2) ∈ Z3+ : n0 + n1 + n2 = N}.
We note that |ΣN | = 3N and |Σ¯N | =
(
N+2
2
)
.
The one-step transition probabilities using the first approach depend on three
probabilities p0, p1, p2. If only game B is played, then the one-step transition
probabilities have the simple form
P
(N)
B (x,y) :=
{
N−1pxi if yi = xi + 1 (mod 3) and yj = xj for all j 6= i
N−1qxi if yi = xi − 1 (mod 3) and yj = xj for all j 6= i
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where qx := 1 − px for x = 0, 1, 2, and P (N)B (x,y) = 0
otherwise. We adopt the parameterization (2) with ε = 0.
If only game A′ is played, then the one-step transition matrix is symmetric
and of the form
P
(N)
A′ (x,y) := [N(N − 1)]−1
if, for some i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} with i 6= j, we have yi = xi − 1 (mod 3),
yj = xj + 1 (mod 3), and yk = xk for all k 6= i, j. Finally, if the two games
are mixed, that is, game A′ is played with probability γ ∈ (0, 1) and game B is
played with probability 1− γ, then our one-step transition matrix has the form
P
(N)
(γ,1−γ) := γP
(N)
A′ + (1 − γ)P (N)B .
The one-step transition probabilities using the second approach also depend
on the three probabilities p0, p1, p2 and are best summarized in the form of a
table. See Table 1, which is essentially from Ethier (2007).
That the two approaches to the model are equivalent, at least in the sta-
tionary setting, is a consequence of the following simple lemma, which is easily
seen to be applicable to P
(N)
B and P
(N)
(γ,1−γ).
We first need some notation. Given a finite set E and an integer N ≥ 2,
put EN := E × · · · × E. Given a permutation σ of {1, 2, . . . , N} and x =
(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ EN , write xσ := (xσ(1), . . . , xσ(N)).
Lemma 1. Let E be a finite set, fix N ≥ 2, let P be the one-step transition
matrix for an irreducible Markov chain in the product space EN , and let pi be
its unique stationary distribution. If, for every permutation σ of {1, 2, . . . , N},
P (xσ,yσ) = P (x,y)
for all x,y ∈ EN , then pi is exchangeable, that is, for every permutation σ of
{1, 2, . . . , N}, we have pi(xσ) = pi(x) for all x ∈ EN .
Proof. Given a permutation σ of {1, 2, . . . , N}, define the distribution piσ on
EN by piσ(x) := pi(xσ). Then
piσ(y) =
∑
x∈EN
pi(x)P (x,yσ) =
∑
x∈EN
pi(xσ)P (xσ,yσ) =
∑
x∈EN
piσ(x)P (x,y)
for all y ∈ EN , hence by the uniqueness of stationary distributions, piσ = pi.
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Table 1: One-step transitions using the second approach, for both game A′ and
game B. From state (n0, n1, n2), a transition is made to state (n
′
0, n
′
1, n
′
2).
type of
(n′0, n
′
1, n
′
2) type of game winner probability
player played / result
(n0 − 2, n1 + 1, n2 + 1) 0 A′ 0 [N(N − 1)]−1n0(n0 − 1)
(n0 − 1, n1 − 1, n2 + 2) 0 A′ 1 [N(N − 1)]−1n0n1
(n0, n1, n2) 0 A
′ 2 [N(N − 1)]−1n0n2
(n0, n1, n2) 1 A
′ 0 [N(N − 1)]−1n1n0
(n0 + 1, n1 − 2, n2 + 1) 1 A′ 1 [N(N − 1)]−1n1(n1 − 1)
(n0 + 2, n1 − 1, n2 − 1) 1 A′ 2 [N(N − 1)]−1n1n2
(n0 − 1, n1 + 2, n2 − 1) 2 A′ 0 [N(N − 1)]−1n2n0
(n0, n1, n2) 2 A
′ 1 [N(N − 1)]−1n2n1
(n0 + 1, n1 + 1, n2 − 2) 2 A′ 2 [N(N − 1)]−1n2(n2 − 1)
(n0 − 1, n1 + 1, n2) 0 B win N−1n0p0
(n0 − 1, n1, n2 + 1) 0 B lose N−1n0q0
(n0, n1 − 1, n2 + 1) 1 B win N−1n1p1
(n0 + 1, n1 − 1, n2) 1 B lose N−1n1q1
(n0 + 1, n1, n2 − 1) 2 B win N−1n2p2
(n0, n1 + 1, n2 − 1) 2 B lose N−1n2q2
We would like to apply results of Ethier and Lee (2009) to game B and to
the mixed game. (They do not apply to game A′ because the one-step transition
matrix P
(N)
A′ is not irreducible, but the behavior of the system is clear in this
case.) We restate those results here for convenience.
Consider an irreducible aperiodic Markov chain {Xn}n≥0 with finite state
space Σ. It evolves according to the one-step transition matrix P = (Pij)i,j∈Σ.
Let us denote its unique stationary distribution by pi = (pii)i∈Σ. Let w : Σ×Σ 7→
R be an arbitrary function, which we write as a matrixW = (w(i, j))i,j∈Σ and
refer to as the payoff matrix. Finally, define the sequences {ξn}n≥1 and {Sn}n≥1
by
ξn := w(Xn−1, Xn), n ≥ 1, (4)
and
Sn := ξ1 + · · ·+ ξn, n ≥ 1. (5)
Let Π denote the square matrix each of whose rows is pi, and let Z := (I−(P −
Π))−1 denote the fundamental matrix. Denote by P˙ (resp., P¨ ) the Hadamard
(entrywise) product P ◦W (resp., P ◦W ◦W ), and let 1 := (1, 1, . . . , 1)T.
Then define
µ := piP˙1 and σ2 := piP¨1− (piP˙1)2 + 2piP˙ (Z −Π)P˙1. (6)
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Theorem 2 (Ethier and Lee 2009). Under the above assumptions, and with the
distribution of X0 arbitrary, limn→∞ n
−1E[Sn] = µ,
Sn
n
→ µ a.s.,
limn→∞ n
−1Var(Sn) = σ
2, and, if σ2 > 0,
Sn − nµ√
nσ2
→d N(0, 1).
If µ = 0 and σ2 > 0, then −∞ = lim infn→∞ Sn < lim supn→∞ Sn =∞ a.s.
We apply this result first with Σ := ΣN and P := P
(N)
B , which is clearly
irreducible and aperiodic. We claim that the stationary distribution pi
(N)
B is the
N -fold product measure pi × pi × · · · × pi, where pi = (pi0, pi1, pi2) denotes the
stationary distribution of the three-state chain in Σ1 with one-step transition
matrix
P
(1)
B =

 0 p0 q0q1 0 p1
p2 q2 0

 .
Indeed,∑
x
pix1 · · ·pixNP (N)B (x,y)
=
N∑
i=1
piy1 · · ·piyi−1piyi+1 · · ·piyN
·
∑
xi:xi 6=yi
pixiP
(N)
B ((y1, . . . , yi−1, xi, yi+1, . . . , yN),y)
= N−1
N∑
i=1
piy1 · · ·piyN
= piy1 · · ·piyN ,
where the first equality holds because state y can be reached in one step only
from states x that differ from y at exactly one coordinate. Alternatively, we
could take Σ := Σ¯N and P := P¯
(N)
B from Table 1. In this case the unique
stationary distribution is multinomial(N,pi).
Next, let us determine the value of µ in the theorem. We have
µ
(N)
B = pi
(N)
B P˙
(N)
B 1 =
∑
x
pix1 · · ·pixN
N∑
i=1
N−1(pxi − qxi)
= N−1
∑
(n0,n1,n2)
(
N
n0, n1, n2
)
pin00 pi
n1
1 pi
n2
2 [n0(p0 − q0) + n1(p1 − q1)
+ n2(p2 − q2)]
= pi0(p0 − q0) + pi1(p1 − q1) + pi2(p2 − q2) = µ(1)B = 0
6
because the parameterization (2) with ε = 0 was chosen to ensure the last
equality.
Now we apply the theorem with Σ := ΣN and P := P
(N)
(γ,1−γ) = γP
(N)
A′ +
(1− γ)P (N)B , where 0 < γ < 1, which is also irreducible and aperiodic (because
P
(N)
B is). Here the unique stationary distribution pi
(N)
(γ,1−γ) is complicated. For
example, in the simplest case, γ = 1/2 and N = 2,
pi
(2)
(1/2,1/2)(0, 0) = (1 + ρ
2)(31 + 47ρ+ 60ρ2 + 47ρ3 + 31ρ4)/d,
pi
(2)
(1/2,1/2)(0, 1) = pi
(2)
(1/2,1/2)(1, 0) = 2(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ
2)(11 + 15ρ+ 9ρ2 + 19ρ3)/d,
pi
(2)
(1/2,1/2)(0, 2) = pi
(2)
(1/2,1/2)(2, 0) = 2(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ
2)(19 + 9ρ+ 15ρ2 + 11ρ3)/d,
pi
(2)
(1/2,1/2)(1, 1) = (1 + ρ)(19 + 21ρ+ 48ρ
2 + 59ρ3 + 27ρ4 + 42ρ5)/d,
pi
(2)
(1/2,1/2)(1, 2) = pi
(2)
(1/2,1/2)(2, 1) = 6(1 + ρ)
2(1 + ρ2)(4 + ρ+ 4ρ2)/d,
pi
(2)
(1/2,1/2)(2, 2) = (1 + ρ)(42 + 27ρ+ 59ρ
2 + 48ρ3 + 21ρ4 + 19ρ5)/d,
where d := 2(13 − 2ρ + 13ρ2)(10 + 20ρ + 21ρ2 + 20ρ3 + 10ρ4). In particular,
each entry of pi
(2)
(1/2,1/2) is the ratio of two degree-6 polynomials in ρ. In another
simple case, γ = 1/2 and N = 3, each entry of pi
(3)
(1/2,1/2) is the ratio of two
degree-14 polynomials in ρ. Fortunately, explicit formulas such as these are
unnecessary to evaluate µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ).
Let p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ) denote the corresponding stationary distribution on Σ¯N . Then
the mean profit per turn to the ensemble of players is
µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ) = pi
(N)
(γ,1−γ)P˙
(N)
(γ,1−γ)1
= (1− γ)
∑
x
pi
(N)
(γ,1−γ)(x1, . . . , xN )
N∑
i=1
N−1(pxi − qxi) (7)
= N−1(1 − γ)
∑
(n0,n1,n2)
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)(n0, n1, n2)[n0(p0 − q0) + n1(p1 − q1)
+ n2(p2 − q2)]
= N−1(1 − γ){E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n0](p0 − q0) + E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n1](p1 − q1)
+ E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n2](p2 − q2)}.
Now by Table 1, we can compute
E[n′0 − n0] = γ
−2n0(n0 − 1)− n0n1 + n1(n1 − 1) + 2n1n2 − n2n0 + n2(n2 − 1)
N(N − 1)
+ (1 − γ)−n0p0 − n0q0 + n1q1 + n2p2
N
=
γ(N − 3n0) + (1− γ)[n0(−1) + n1q1 + n2p2]
N
.
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Similarly,
E[n′1 − n1] =
γ(N − 3n1) + (1 − γ)[n0p0 + n1(−1) + n2q2]
N
,
E[n′2 − n2] =
γ(N − 3n2) + (1 − γ)[n0q0 + n1p1 + n2(−1)]
N
.
In each of these equations, we have used n0 + n1 + n2 = N to simplify, with
the result that all the quadratic terms cancel and the right sides are linear in
(n0, n1, n2), at least if we replace the N in the numerators by n0 + n1 + n2.
Next we take expectations with respect to p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ) to obtain
(0, 0, 0) = (E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n0],E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n1],E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n2])

γ

−2 1 11 −2 1
1 1 −2


+ (1− γ)

−1 p0 q0q1 −1 p1
p2 q2 −1



 ,
which with E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n0]+E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n1]+E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n2] = N uniquely determines
the vector (E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n0],E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n1],E
p¯i
(N)
(γ,1−γ)
[n2]) because the matrix within
brackets is an irreducible infinitesimal matrix. Substituting into (7) and using
our parametrization (2) with ε = 0, we obtain
µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ) =
3γ(1− γ)(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ)
2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2 + γ(5 + 10ρ+ 6ρ2 + 10ρ3 + 5ρ4) + 2γ2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2
,
(8)
which does not depend on N and is positive if 0 < ρ < 1, zero if ρ = 1, and
negative if ρ > 1, indicating that the Parrondo effect is present, regardless of
γ ∈ (0, 1), if ρ 6= 1. (In the case ρ > 1, the effect is sometimes referred to
as a reverse Parrondo effect. We will not make this distinction.) Temporarily
denoting µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ) by µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ)(ρ) to emphasize its dependence on ρ, we note that
µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ)(1/ρ) = −µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ)(ρ),
a fact that can also be proved probabilistically (Ethier and Lee 2009).
When γ = 1/2, this reduces to
µ
(N)
(1/2,1/2) =
3(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ)
2(10 + 20ρ+ 21ρ2 + 20ρ3 + 10ρ4)
.
As we will see in Section 7, this formula appears elsewhere in the literature of
Parrondo’s paradox.
3 An alternative approach
The method used in Section 2 to find µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ) does not extend to finding the
variance (σ
(N)
(γ,1−γ))
2. However, a method that does extend is based on the
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observation that the components of the N -dimensional Markov chain controlling
the mixed game are themselves Markovian.
For example, when game B is played, the Markov chain for player i (one of
the N players) has one-step transition matrix
P
(1,N)
B := N
−1[P
(1)
B + (N − 1)I3]. (9)
On the other hand, the redistribution game A′ affects player i only if i is chosen
as the donor or as the beneficiary (probability (N − 1)/[N(N − 1)] = 1/N for
each). This leads to
P
(1,N)
A′ := N
−1[2P
(1)
A + (N − 2)I3], (10)
where P
(1)
A denotes the one-step transition matrix for the original one-player
Parrondo game A (not A′). In both displayed matrices, the superscript (1, N)
is intended to indicate that the underlying Markov chain controls one of the N
players.
From these one-step transition matrices we calculate
P˙
(1,N)
B := N
−1P˙
(1)
B , P˙
(1,N)
A′ := 2N
−1P˙
(1)
A ,
and
P¨
(1,N)
B := N
−1P¨
(1)
B , P¨
(1,N)
A′ := 2N
−1P¨
(1)
A .
With
P := γP
(1,N)
A′ + (1 − γ)P (1,N)B ,
P˙ := γP˙
(1,N)
A′ + (1 − γ)P˙ (1,N)B ,
P¨ := γP¨
(1,N)
A′ + (1 − γ)P¨ (1,N)B ,
and with pi, Π, and Z chosen accordingly and 1 := (1, 1, 1)T, we have
µ
(1,N)
(γ,1−γ) = piP˙1, (σ
(1,N)
(γ,1−γ))
2 = piP¨1− (piP˙1)2 + 2piP˙ (Z −Π)P˙1.
The mean is readily evaluated to give
µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ) = Nµ
(1,N)
(γ,1−γ) (11)
=
3γ(1− γ)(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ)
2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2 + γ(5 + 10ρ+ 6ρ2 + 10ρ3 + 5ρ4) + 2γ2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2
,
which is consistent with (8) and does not depend onN . The variance (σ
(1,N)
(γ,1−γ))
2
is also easily evaluated but is complicated; instead we provide its asymptotic
value as N →∞ (aN ∼ bN if limN→∞ aN/bN = 1):
(σ
(1,N)
(γ,1−γ))
2
∼ 9[8(1 + γ7)ρ2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)4
9
+ 4(γ + γ6)(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2(1 + 2ρ+ ρ2 + 2ρ3 + ρ4)(1 + 2ρ+ 12ρ2 + 2ρ3 + ρ4)
+ 6(γ2 + γ5)(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2(3 + 20ρ+ 30ρ2 + 40ρ3 + 66ρ4 + 40ρ5 + 30ρ6
+ 20ρ7 + 3ρ8)
+ (γ3 + γ4)(59 + 306ρ+ 864ρ2 + 1738ρ3 + 2781ρ4 + 3636ρ5 + 3912ρ6
+ 3636ρ7 + 2781ρ8 + 1738ρ9 + 864ρ10 + 306ρ11 + 59ρ12)]
/{N [2(1 + γ2)(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2 + γ(5 + 10ρ+ 6ρ2 + 10ρ3 + 5ρ4)]3}. (12)
4 Variance parameter for game B
Let P be the one-step transition matrix for an irreducible aperiodic Markov
chain, let pi be its unique stationary distribution, and letΠ be the square matrix
each of whose rows is pi. Denote by ZP := (I − (P −Π))−1 the fundamental
matrix of P .
Lemma 3. For each positive integer N , Z(1/N)P+(1−1/N)I −Π = N(ZP −Π).
Proof. The one-step transition matrix (1/N)P + (1− 1/N)I has the same sta-
tionary distribution pi, hence the same Π, so
Z(1/N)P+(1−1/N)I = (I− [(1/N)P +(1−1/N)I−Π])−1 = N(I−(P −NΠ))−1,
hence it suffices to prove that
(I − (P −NΠ))−1 − (1/N)Π = (I − (P −Π))−1 −Π.
For this it is enough that
(I − (P −NΠ))[(I − (P −NΠ))−1 − (1/N)Π]
= (I − (P −Π) + (N − 1)Π)[(I − (P −Π))−1 −Π]
or
I − (1/N)(I − (P −NΠ))Π
= I − (I − (P −Π))Π+ (N − 1)Π[(I − (P −Π))−1 −Π]. (13)
Now ΠP = PΠ = Π, Π2 = Π, and so Π = Π(I − (P −Π)) and Π(I − (P −
Π))−1 = Π. So (13) is equivalent to
I − (1/N)(Π− (Π−NΠ)) = I − (Π− (Π−Π)) + (N − 1)(Π−Π)
or I −Π = I −Π, hence (13), and therefore the lemma, is established.
We want to use this to evaluate the variance parameter for Toral’s N -player
game B, in which there is no redistribution of wealth. The state space is ΣN
and the one-step transition probabilities are as previously specified. We assume
the parameterization (2) with ε = 0.
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We have seen that the stationary distribution pi
(N)
B is the N -fold product
measure pi×pi×· · ·×pi, where pi = (pi0, pi1, pi2) denotes the stationary distribu-
tion of the three-state chain with one-step transition matrix P
(1)
B . Specifically,
pi0 =
1 + ρ2
2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)
, pi1 =
ρ(1 + ρ)
2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)
, pi2 =
1 + ρ
2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)
.
In principle, we could use the formula σ2 := piP¨1− (piP˙1)2+2piP˙ (Z−Π)P˙1,
but the evaluation of the 3N × 3N fundamental matrix Z is difficult, so we take
a different approach.
The key observation is that each coordinate of the N -dimensional Markov
chain is a one-dimensional Markov chain with one-step transition matrix (9) or
P
(1,N)
B := (1/N)P
(1)
B + (1 − 1/N)I3.
Further, the coordinate processes are independent if their initial states are, and
they are if the initial state of the N -dimensional process has the stationary
distribution pi
(N)
B on ΣN .
As already noted in Section 3, P˙
(1,N)
B = (1/N)P˙
(1)
B and P¨
(1,N)
B = (1/N)P¨
(1)
B .
By Lemma 3, Z
(1,N)
B −Π = N(Z(1)B −Π), so (since µ(1,N)B = N−1µ(1)B = 0)
(σ
(1,N)
B )
2 := piP¨
(1,N)
B 1+ 2piP˙
(1,N)
B (Z
(1,N)
B −Π)P˙ (1,N)B 1
= N−1[piP¨
(1)
B 1+ 2piP˙
(1)
B (Z
(1)
B −Π)P˙ (1)B 1]
= N−1(σ
(1)
B )
2 = N−1
(
3ρ
1 + ρ+ ρ2
)2
.
Finally, let Sn denote the profit to the ensemble of N players after n plays of
game B, with S
[i]
n denoting the profit to player i. Then Sn = S
[1]
n + · · · + S[N ]n
and the summands are independent (assuming the stationary initial distribution
mentioned above), hence
(σ
(N)
B )
2 = lim
n→∞
n−1Var(Sn) = N lim
n→∞
n−1Var(S[1]n )
= N(σ
(1,N)
B )
2 =
(
3ρ
1 + ρ+ ρ2
)2
, (14)
yielding a simple and explicit formula for (σ
(N)
B )
2, which does not depend on N .
5 Variance parameter for random mixtures
With Sn denoting the profit to the ensemble of N players after n plays of the
mixed game, let S
[i]
n denote the profit to player i (one of the N players) after n
plays of the mixed game. Then
Sn =
N∑
i=1
S[i]n ,
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so
Var(Sn) =
N∑
i=1
Var(S[i]n ) + 2
∑
1≤i<j≤N
Cov(S[i]n , S
[j]
n )
= NVar(S[1]n ) +N(N − 1)Cov(S[1]n , S[2]n ).
Dividing by n and letting n→∞, we find that
(σ
(N)
(γ,1−γ))
2 = N(σ
(1,N)
(γ,1−γ))
2 +N(N − 1)σ([1,2],N)(γ,1−γ) , (15)
where the last superscript is intended to indicate that the underlying Markov
chain controls players 1 and 2 of the N players. We know how to evaluate
(σ
(1,N)
(γ,1−γ))
2, so it remains to find σ
([1,2],N)
(γ,1−γ) .
For this we will need an extension of (4)–(6). With the same assumptions
on {Xn}n≥0 (an irreducible, aperiodic, finite Markov chain in Σ with one-step
transition matrix P and unique stationary distribution pi), we let w[1], w[2] :
Σ × Σ 7→ R be two functions with W [1] and W [2] denoting the corresponding
matrices, and define
ξ[1]n := w
[1](Xn−1, Xn), ξ
[2]
n := w
[2](Xn−1, Xn), n ≥ 1,
and
S[1]n := ξ
[1]
1 + · · ·+ ξ[1]n , S[2]n := ξ[2]1 + · · ·+ ξ[2]n , n ≥ 1.
Let Π and Z be associated with P in the usual way. Denote by P [1], P [2], and
P [1,2] the Hadamard products P ◦W [1], P ◦W [2], and P ◦W [1] ◦W [2], resp.,
and let 1 := (1, 1, . . . , 1)T. Then define the covariance parameter
σ[1,2] := piP [1,2]1− (piP [1]1)(piP [2]1)
+ piP [1](Z −Π)P [2]1+ piP [2](Z −Π)P [1]1.
The interpretation of this parameter is as follows.
Theorem 4. Under the above assumptions, and with the distribution of X0
arbitrary,
lim
n→∞
n−1Cov(S[1]n , S
[2]
n ) = σ
[1,2].
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof that limn→∞ n
−1Var(Sn) = σ
2 in The-
orem 2, which is just the special case w[1] = w[2] = w.
We now want to apply this to find σ
([1,2],N)
(γ,1−γ) . This involves only players 1
and 2, for which we need only a (9-state) Markov chain in Σ2. The reduced
model that does not distinguish between the players but only counts how many
players of each type there are is insufficient.
Thinking of (i, j) ∈ Σ2 as the base-3 representation of the integer 3i+ j, we
order the elements of Σ2 by their values (0–8). The one-step transition matrix
for the profit to players 1 and 2 when N players are playing game B is
P
(2,N)
B := N
−1[2P
(2)
B + (N − 2)I9],
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where P
(2)
B is as in Section 2 with N = 2. The superscript (2, N) is intended to
indicate that the underlying Markov chain controls two of the N players. The
one-step transition matrix for the profit to players 1 and 2 when N players are
playing game A′ is
P
(2,N)
A′ := [N(N − 1)]−1[2PA0 + 4(N − 2)PA1 + (N − 2)(N − 3)I9],
where PA0 is a 9 × 9 matrix with two entries (each equal to 1/2) in each row,
corresponding to one-unit transfers 1 → 2 and 2 → 1; similarly, PA1 is a 9 × 9
matrix with four entries (each equal to 1/4) in each row, corresponding to one-
unit transfers 1 → ·, · → 1, 2 → ·, and · → 2, where · represents the players
other than 1 and 2. The functions w[1] and w[2] can be specified as follows.
Corresponding to matrices P
(2)
B and PA1 , the function w
[1] is 1 at (1 wins) and
at · → 1; it is −1 at (1 loses) and at 1 → ·; and it is 0 at (2 wins) or (2 loses)
and at · → 2 and 2→ ·. Corresponding to matrix PA0 , the function w[1] is 1 at
2→ 1; it is −1 at 1→ 2. The function w[2] is defined exactly in the same way
but with the roles of 1 and 2 reversed.
From these one-step transition matrices we calculate
(P
(2,N)
B )
[1] := 2N−1(P
(2)
B )
[1], (P
(2,N)
B )
[2] := 2N−1(P
(2)
B )
[2],
(P
(2,N)
A′ )
[1] := [N(N − 1)]−1[2(PA0)[1] + 4(N − 2)(PA1)[1]],
(P
(2,N)
A′ )
[2] := [N(N − 1)]−1[2(PA0)[2] + 4(N − 2)(PA1)[2]],
(P
(2,N)
B )
[1,2] := 0, and
(P
(2,N)
A′ )
[1,2] := 2[N(N − 1)]−1(PA0)[1,2].
With
P := γP
(2,N)
A′ + (1− γ)P (2,N)B ,
P [1] := γ(P
(2,N)
A′ )
[1] + (1 − γ)(P (2,N)B )[1],
P [2] := γ(P
(2,N)
A′ )
[2] + (1 − γ)(P (2,N)B )[2],
P [1,2] := γ(P
(2,N)
A′ )
[1,2] + (1− γ)(P (2,N)B )[1,2],
and with pi, Π, and Z chosen accordingly and 1 := (1, 1, 1)T, we can evaluate
σ
([1,2],N)
(γ,1−γ) := piP
[1,2]
1− (piP [1]1)(piP [2]1)
+ piP [1](Z −Π)P [2]1+ piP [2](Z −Π)P [1]1
as a function of N , at least if we fix ρ and γ.
With ρ = 1/3 and γ = 1/2, we conclude that
(σ
(N)
(1/2,1/2))
2 = 27(−36821493886409+ 71724260647553N − 46282959184439N2
13
+ 9902542819695N3) (16)
/[8331019058(−269171+ 524347N − 338381N2 + 72405N3)],
which is monotonically increasing in N ≥ 2, ranging from
(σ
(2)
(1/2,1/2))
2 =
114315959583
258261590798
≈ 0.442636
to
lim
N→∞
(σ
(N)
(1/2,1/2))
2 =
5941525691817
13404609664322
≈ 0.443245.
Let us summarize our results for random mixtures. Let Sn be the cumulative
profit after n turns to the ensemble of N ≥ 2 players playing the mixed game
γA′ + (1 − γ)B, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. We assume the parameterization (2) with
ε = 0.
Theorem 5. If γ = 1 so that game A′ is always played, then P(Sn = 0 for all
n ≥ 1) = 1.
If γ = 0 so that game B is always played, then {Sn−Sn−1}n≥1 satisfies the
SLLN and the CLT with mean and variance parameters µ
(N)
B = 0 and (σ
(N)
B )
2
as in (14).
If 0 < γ < 1 so that both games are played, then {Sn − Sn−1}n≥1 satisfies
the SLLN and the CLT with mean and variance parameters µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ) as in (8)
(or (11)) and (σ
(N)
(γ,1−γ))
2, at least when ρ = 1/3 and γ = 1/2, as in (16). When
ρ 6= 1/3 or γ 6= 1/2, we implicitly assume that (σ(N)(γ,1−γ))2 > 0.
Proof. The first conclusion is obvious. The second and third conclusions follow
from Theorem 1, though the mean and variance parameters are obtained not
from the theorem but by using the methods described in the text.
To compare our results with those of Toral (2002), we must restore the bias
parameter ε > 0. For simplicity, let us take γ = 1/2, as he did. Then
µ
(N)
(1/2,1/2) = {3[2(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ)− ε(13 + 26ρ+ 30ρ2 + 26ρ3 + 13ρ4) (17)
+ ε2(1 − ρ)3(1 + ρ)− 2ε3(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)]}/{2[2(10 + 20ρ
+ 21ρ2 + 20ρ3 + 10ρ4)− ε(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ) + 3ε2(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)]}.
Toral reported a simulation with ρ = 1/3, γ = 1/2, ε = 1/100, and N = 200.
Actually, ε = 1/1000 was intended (personal communication 2011). With ρ =
1/3 and ε = 1/1000, (17) reduces to 193387599/6704101000 ≈ 0.028846, with
which Toral’s estimate, 0.029, is consistent.
6 Mean profit for nonrandom patterns
Toral (2002) omitted discussion of the case in which his games A′ and B are
played in a nonrandom periodic pattern such as A′BBA′BBA′BB · · · . Let us
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denote by [r, s] the pattern (A′)rBs repeated ad infinitum. We would like to
apply the results of Ethier and Lee (2009) to the pattern [r, s], showing that
the Parrondo effect is present for all r, s ≥ 1. (Unlike in the original one-player
Parrondo games, the case r = s = 1 is included.) We do this by showing that the
mean profit per turn for the ensemble of players, µ
(N)
[r,s], is positive if 0 < ρ < 1,
zero if ρ = 1, and negative if ρ > 1, for all r, s ≥ 1 and N ≥ 2. As we will see,
here the mean parameter depends on N and it takes a particularly simple form
in the limit as N →∞.
First, Theorem 6 of Ethier and Lee (2009) is applicable. (The assumption
there that PA is irreducible and aperiodic is unnecessary.) But again it is
simplest to apply the results to one or two players at a time, as we did in
Sections 3 and 5. Let us begin by finding the mean parameter µ
(N)
[r,s].
For the original one-player Parrondo games, in which
PA :=
1
2

 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0

 , PB :=

 0 p0 q0q1 0 p1
p2 q2 0

 , W :=

 0 1 −1−1 0 1
1 −1 0

 .
Ethier and Lee (2009) showed that
µ[r,s] =
1
r + s
pis,rR diag
(
s,
1− es1
1− e1 ,
1− es2
1− e2
)
Lζ,
where pis,r is the unique stationary distribution of P
s
BP
r
A, R is the matrix of
right eigenvectors of PB, e1 and e2 are the nonunit eigenvalues of PB, L :=
R−1, and ζ := (PB ◦W )1. They further showed that this formula reduces
algebraically to
µ[r,s] = Er,s/Dr,s,
where
Er,s := 3ar{[2 + (3ar − 1)(es1 + es2 − 2es1es2)− (es1 + es2)](1− ρ)(1 + ρ)S
+ ar(e
s
2 − es1)[5(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)− 4ρ2]}(1− ρ)2 (18)
and
Dr,s := 4(r + s)[1 + (3ar − 1)es1][1 + (3ar − 1)es2](1 + ρ+ ρ2)2S (19)
with ar := (1− (−1/2)r)/3 and S :=
√
(1 + ρ2)(1 + 4ρ+ ρ2).
We apply these results but with PA and PB replaced by
P
(1,N)
A′ := N
−1[2P
(1)
A + (N − 2)I3] and P (1,N)B := N−1[P (1)B + (N − 1)I3].
Now (P
(1,N)
A′ )
r is given by the same formula as P rA but with ar redefined as
ar := [1− (1 − 3/N)r]/3, (20)
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and (P
(1,N)
B )
s has the same spectral representation as P sB but with the nonunit
eigenvalues replaced by
e1 := 1− 1− e
◦
1
N
, e2 := 1− 1− e
◦
2
N
, (21)
where e◦1 and e
◦
2 are the nonunit eigenvalues of PB, namely
e◦1 := −
1
2
+
(1− ρ)S
2(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ2)
, e◦2 := −
1
2
− (1− ρ)S
2(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ2)
.
The matrices R and L are unchanged.
We conclude that
µ
(N)
[r,s] = NEr,s/Dr,s, (22)
where Er,s and Dr,s are as in (18) and (19) with only the changes (20) and (21).
For example, this leads to
µ
(N)
[1,1] = 3N(2N − 3)(1 − ρ)3(1 + ρ)/{2[18(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2 − 3N(13 + 26ρ
+ 30ρ2 + 26ρ3 + 13ρ4) + 2N2(10 + 20ρ+ 21ρ2 + 20ρ3 + 10ρ4)]}
and
µ
(N)
[1,2]
= 2N(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ)[−3(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2 +N(10 + 20ρ+ 21ρ2 + 20ρ3 + 10ρ4)
− 9N2(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2) + 3N3(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)]/[36(1 + ρ+ ρ2)4
− 12N(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2(11 + 22ρ+ 24ρ2 + 22ρ3 + 11ρ4) +N2(193 + 772ρ
+ 1660ρ2 + 2548ρ3 + 2938ρ4 + 2548ρ5 + 1660ρ6 + 772ρ7 + 193ρ8)
− 3N3(1 + ρ)2(43 + 86ρ+ 145ρ2 + 172ρ3 + 145ρ4 + 86ρ5 + 43ρ6)
+N4(1 + ρ)2(35 + 70ρ+ 113ρ2 + 140ρ3 + 113ρ4 + 70ρ5 + 35ρ6)].
Both of these functions are positive for all N ≥ 2, as can be seen by expanding
numerators and denominators in powers ofN−2 and noticing that all coefficients
are polynomials in ρ with only positive coefficients.
Although these formulas become increasingly complicated as r and s in-
crease, their limits as N → ∞ have a very simple form. To see this, it suffices
to note that
ar =
r
N
+O
(
1
N2
)
, es1 = 1−
(1 − e◦1)s
N
+O
(
1
N2
)
,
and similarly for es2, so (22) converges as N →∞ to
3rs(1 − ρ)3(1 + ρ)
9r2(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2) + 9rs(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2) + 2s2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2
,
which coincides with (8) (or (11)) when γ = r/(r + s). This limit is positive if
0 < ρ < 1, zero if ρ = 1, and negative if ρ > 1, so we conclude that the Parrondo
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effect is present for all r, s ≥ 1, as long as N is large enough and ρ 6= 1. This
relationship between the random-mixture case and the nonrandom-pattern case
is not present in the original one-player Parrondo games except in a single case
(r = 2, s = 1). (We have confirmed this for r, s ≥ 1 and r + s ≤ 75 and expect
that it is true generally.)
We now verify that the Parrondo effect is always present. We begin with a
lemma.
Lemma 6. If 0 < a < b < c, then (cn − bn)/(bn − an) is increasing in n ≥ 1.
Proof. Divide both numerator and denominator by bn to see that we can, with-
out loss of generality, assume that b = 1. So the aim is to show that
cn − 1
1− an <
cn+1 − 1
1− an+1 , n ≥ 1,
or that
cn − 1
cn+1 − 1 <
an − 1
an+1 − 1 , n ≥ 1.
For this it is enough to fix n ≥ 1 and show that the function
f(x) :=
xn − 1
xn+1 − 1 ,
defined by continuity at x = 1, is decreasing on (0,∞). Its derivative has the
same sign as
−[xn+1 − (n+ 1)x+ n],
so it is enough that the quantity within brackets is positive for x > 1 and
0 < x < 1. First suppose that x > 1. Then
xn+1 − (n+ 1)x+ n = (x− 1 + 1)n+1 − (n+ 1)(x− 1)− 1
= (x− 1)n+1 +
(
n+ 1
1
)
(x− 1)n + · · ·+
(
n+ 1
n− 1
)
(x− 1)2
> 0.
Next suppose that 0 < x < 1. Then
xn+1 − (n+ 1)x+ n = xn+1 − 1− (n+ 1)(x− 1)
= (x− 1)(xn + xn−1 + · · ·+ x+ 1)− (n+ 1)(x− 1)
= (x− 1)[xn + xn−1 + · · ·+ x+ 1− (n+ 1)]
> 0.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 7. µ
(N)
[r,s] is positive if 0 < ρ < 1, zero if ρ = 1, and negative if ρ > 1,
for all r, s ≥ 1 and N ≥ 2.
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Proof. Denoting µ
(N)
[r,s] temporarily by µ
(N)
[r,s](ρ) to emphasize its dependence on
ρ, it can be shown algebraically or probabilistically that
µ
(N)
[r,s](1/ρ) = −µ
(N)
[r,s](ρ),
so it will suffice to treat the case 0 < ρ < 1. First, |3ar−1| < 1 and e1, e2 ∈ (0, 1),
so Dr,s > 0. Since ar > 0, it suffices to show that
[2 + (3ar − 1)(es1 + es2 − 2es1es2)− (es1 + es2)](1 − ρ)(1 + ρ)S
+ ar(e
s
2 − es1)[5(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)− 4ρ2] > 0.
Discarding the −4ρ2 term (since es2 − es1 < 0), it is enough to show that
(1− es1)[1 + (3ar − 1)es2] + (1− es2)[1 + (3ar − 1)es1]
− ar(es1 − es2)
5(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ2)
(1 − ρ)S > 0. (23)
Now e◦1 = (−1+x)/2 and e◦2 = (−1−x)/2, where x := (1−ρ)S/[(1+ρ)(1+ρ2)] ∈
(0, 1), so e1 = (2N − 3 + x)/(2N) and e2 = (2N − 3− x)/(2N).
Let us first assume that N ≥ 3. Then 3ar − 1 ≤ 0, so, replacing es1 and es2
within brackets in (23) by 1, we need only show that
3(1− es1) + 3(1− es2) > (es1 − es2)
5(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ2)
(1− ρ)S ,
or that
2(2N)s − [(2N − 3 + x)s + (2N − 3− x)s]
[(2N − 3 + x)s − (2N − 3− x)s]/x >
5
3
. (24)
The denominator is a polynomial of degree s− 1 in x with positive coefficients,
while the term within brackets in the numerator is a polynomial of degree s in
x with positive coefficients. So the left side of (24) is decreasing in x, and it
suffices to verify it at x = 1. For this we notice that
2(2N)s − [(2N − 2)s + (2N − 4)s]
(2N − 2)s − (2N − 4)s = 2
Ns − (N − 1)s
(N − 1)s − (N − 2)s + 1,
and the fraction on the right is increasing in s ≥ 1 by Lemma 6. At s = 1 the
value is 3, so the desired inequality holds.
It remains only to consider the case N = 2. The same argument works if
r is even because then 3ar − 1 ≤ 0 still holds. If r is odd, we can replace the
quantities within brackets in (23) by 1 and can replace ar in the second line of
(23) by a1 = 1/2. Thus, we need only verify (24) with 5/3 replaced by 5/2, and
of course it still holds.
7 Remark on a “coincidence”
We can prove algebraically that
lim
M→∞
µ
(M)
[r,r] = µ
(N)
(1/2,1/2) = (3/2)µ
(1)
(2/3,1/3) = (3/2)µ
(1)
[2,1] = µ
(2)
[1,1]
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=
3(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ)
2(10 + 20ρ+ 21ρ2 + 20ρ3 + 10ρ4)
for all r ≥ 1 and N ≥ 2, where superscripts refer to the number of players.
(For superscripts equal to 1, the games are A and B, the original one-player
Parrondo games. For superscripts 2 or larger, the games are A′ and B.) The
first equality is from Section 6. Can the others be explained probabilistically?
We can elucidate at least the second equality, while the third and fourth remain
partially unexplained.
Since µ
(N)
(γ,1−γ) does not depend on N , it is enough to verify the identity with
N = 2. Let us consider the profit of one player when two players are playing.
Recalling (9) and (10) with N = 2, we have
P
(1,2)
A′ := P
(1)
A and P
(1,2)
B := (1/2)(P
(1)
B + I3).
The former is just the one-step transition matrix for the original one-player
game A, and we have
(1/2)P
(1,2)
A′ + (1/2)P
(1,2)
B = (1/2)P
(1)
A + (1/4)P
(1)
B + (1/4)I3.
The left side describes the (1/2, 1/2) mixture of games A′ and B, as viewed
by one of two players. Its mean is (1/2)µ
(2)
(1/2,1/2). The right side describes the
(2/3, 1/3)-mixture of gamesA andB if we ignore the (1/4)I3 term and normalize
to ensure a stochastic matrix. That term just slows down the process, making
one-fourth of its transitions null. So its mean is (3/4)µ
(1)
(2/3,1/3). These are equal,
so µ
(2)
(1/2,1/2) = (3/2)µ
(1)
(2/3,1/3), as claimed.
This can be regarded as a more correct version of the argument sketched in
the third paragraph of page L307 of Toral (2002) and attributed to an anony-
mous referee of that paper.
8 Variance parameter for nonrandom patterns
We can evaluate the variance parameter (σ
(N)
[r,s])
2 for the nonrandom pattern
[r, s] in the N -player games directly for small N , using the state space Σ¯N with
its
(
N+2
2
)
states. We apply (25)–(27) of Ethier and Lee (2009), obtaining, for
example,
(σ
(2)
[1,1])
2
= [9(466 + 2680ρ+ 7621ρ2 + 16310ρ3 + 29018ρ4 + 41582ρ5 + 51471ρ6
+ 55998ρ7 + 51471ρ8 + 41582ρ9 + 29018ρ10 + 16310ρ11 + 7621ρ12
+ 2680ρ13 + 466ρ14)]/[4(2− ρ+ 2ρ2)(10 + 20ρ+ 21ρ2 + 20ρ3 + 10ρ4)3],
which reduces when ρ = 1/3 to 74176355601/141627323986 ≈ 0.523743. Since
N = 2, this is a computation involving 6× 6 matrices.
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To get results for larger N , we apply the method of considering one or two
players at a time. By analogy with (15), we have
(σ
(N)
[r,s])
2 = N(σ
(1,N)
[r,s] )
2 +N(N − 1)σ([1,2],N)[r,s] ,
where
(σ
(1,N)
[r,s] )
2 =
1
r + s
{ r−1∑
u=0
[piP uAP¨A1− (piP uAP˙A1)2]
+
s−1∑
v=0
[piP rAP
v
BP¨B1− (piP rAP vBP˙B1)2]
+ 2
∑
0≤u<v≤r−1
piP uAP˙A(P
v−u−1
A −ΠP vA)P˙A1
+ 2
r−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
piP uAP˙A(P
r−u−1
A −ΠP rA)P vBP˙B1
+ 2
∑
0≤u<v≤s−1
piP rAP
u
BP˙B(P
v−u−1
B −ΠP rAP vB)P˙B1
+ 2
[ r−1∑
u=0
r−1∑
v=0
piP uAP˙AP
r−u−1
A P
s
B(Z −Π)P vAP˙A1
+
r−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
piP uAP˙AP
r−u−1
A P
s
B(Z −Π)P rAP vBP˙B1
+
s−1∑
u=0
r−1∑
v=0
piP rAP
u
BP˙BP
s−u−1
B (Z −Π)P vAP˙A1
+
s−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
piP rAP
u
BP˙BP
s−u−1
B (Z −Π)P rAP vBP˙B1
]}
(from Ethier and Lee 2009) with PA and PB replaced by P
(1,N)
A′ and P
(1,N)
B as
defined in Section 3.
The covariance term, σ
([1,2],N)
[r,s] , requires an extension of the preceding for-
mula to covariances. We omit the details of the derivation and just give the
result:
σ
([1,2],N)
[r,s] =
1
r + s
{ r−1∑
u=0
[piP uAP
[1,2]
A 1− (piP uAP [1]A 1)(piP uAP [2]A 1)]
+
s−1∑
v=0
[piP rAP
v
BP
[1,2]
B 1− (piP rAP vBP [1]B 1)(piP rAP vBP [2]B 1)]
+
∑
0≤u<v≤r−1
[piP uAP
[1]
A (P
v−u−1
A −ΠP vA)P [2]A 1
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+ piP uAP
[2]
A (P
v−u−1
A −ΠP vA)P [1]A 1]
+
r−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
[piP uAP
[1]
A (P
r−u−1
A −ΠP rA)P vBP [2]B 1
+ piP uAP
[2]
A (P
r−u−1
A −ΠP rA)P vBP [1]B 1]
+
∑
0≤u<v≤s−1
[piP rAP
u
BP
[1]
B (P
v−u−1
B −ΠP rAP vB)P [2]B 1
+ piP rAP
u
BP
[2]
B (P
v−u−1
B −ΠP rAP vB)P [1]B 1]
+
r−1∑
u=0
r−1∑
v=0
[piP uAP
[1]
A P
r−u−1
A P
s
B(Z −Π)P vAP [2]A 1
+ piP uAP
[2]
A P
r−u−1
A P
s
B(Z −Π)P vAP [1]A 1]
+
r−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
[piP uAP
[1]
A P
r−u−1
A P
s
B(Z −Π)P rAP vBP [2]B 1
+ piP uAP
[2]
A P
r−u−1
A P
s
B(Z −Π)P rAP vBP [1]B 1]
+
s−1∑
u=0
r−1∑
v=0
[piP rAP
u
BP
[1]
B P
s−u−1
B (Z −Π)P vAP [2]A 1
+ piP rAP
u
BP
[2]
B P
s−u−1
B (Z −Π)P vAP [1]A 1]
+
s−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
[piP rAP
u
BP
[1]
B P
s−u−1
B (Z −Π)P rAP vBP [2]B 1
+ piP rAP
u
BP
[2]
B P
s−u−1
B (Z −Π)P rAP vBP [1]B 1]
}
with PA and PB replaced by P
(2,N)
A′ and P
(2,N)
B as defined in Section 5.
By analogy to (16), with ρ = 1/3, we conclude that
(σ
(N)
[1,1])
2 = 9(615639408424560− 6408926620214040N + 29541545957894139N2
− 80214814200037491N3+ 143582273075781927N4
− 179192557802543130N5+ 160434481099881996N6
− 104152159483211664N7+ 48799091685478468N8
− 16137521956595246N9+ 3584898779152593N10
− 481633399018397N11+ 29679648590925N12)
/[2(1521− 3174N + 1609N2)3(3285360− 9816120N + 12525387N2
− 8725589N3+ 3501928N4− 768851N5 + 72405N6)], (25)
which is monotonically decreasing in N , ranging from
(σ
(2)
[1,1])
2 =
74176355601
141627323986
≈ 0.523743
to
lim
N→∞
(σ
(N)
[1,1])
2 =
5935929718185
13404609664322
≈ 0.442827.
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This last number differs slightly from the corresponding limit in the random-
mixture case, showing that the variances lack the nice property that the means
enjoy.
Similar formulas can be found for other [r, s], assuming ρ = 1/3. With
[r, s] = [1, 2] (resp., [2, 1], [2, 2], [2, 4], [3, 3], [4, 2]), we get in place of (25) a ratio
of degree-21 (resp., 24, 33, 51, 54, 57) polynomials in N , and
lim
N→∞
(σ
(N)
[r,s])
2 =


1891312136577
6060711605323 ≈ 0.312061 if [r, s] = [2, 1] or [4, 2],
5935929718185
13404609664322 ≈ 0.442827 if [r, s] = [1, 1] or [2, 2] or [3, 3],
136286243910
252688187761 ≈ 0.539346 if [r, s] = [1, 2] or [2, 4].
In particular, it appears that the result for [r, s] depends on r and s only through
r/(r+s). We have confirmed this only in the several cases shown above; a proof
for all integers r, s ≥ 1 seems difficult.
Let us summarize our results for nonrandom patterns. Let Sn be the cu-
mulative profit after n turns to the ensemble of N ≥ 2 players playing the
nonrandom pattern (A′)rBs (denoted by [r, s]) repeatedly, with r and s being
positive integers. We assume the parameterization (2) with ε = 0.
Theorem 8. {Sn − Sn−1}n≥1 satisfies the SLLN and the CLT with mean and
variance parameters µ
(N)
[r,s] computable for specified r, s ≥ 1 as a function of
N ≥ 2 and ρ > 0 and (σ(N)[r,s])2 computable for specified r, s ≥ 1, N ≥ 2, and
ρ > 0. We implicitly assume that (σ
(N)
[r,s])
2 > 0.
Proof. The proof is as for Theorem 5, except that, instead of citing Theorem 1,
we cite Theorem 6 of Ethier and Lee (2009).
9 Sample variance of players’ capitals
Recall our notation in which S
[i]
n is the capital of player i (one of the N players)
after n trials, so that
Sn :=
N∑
i=1
S[i]n
is the total capital of the N players after n trials. Toral (2002) simulated the
sample variance of S
[1]
n , . . . , S
[N ]
n , namely
1
N
[ N∑
i=1
(S[i]n )
2 −N
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
S[i]n
)2]
,
finding that it grows approximately linearly in n. Let us replace this sample
variance by its unbiased (at least in the case of a random sample) version,
(σˆ(N))2n :=
1
N − 1
[ N∑
i=1
(S[i]n )
2 −N
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
S[i]n
)2]
,
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and let us consider its expectation E[(σˆ(N))2n] instead of the random variable
itself. We can evaluate this using the results already obtained. Indeed,
E[(σˆ(N))2n] :=
1
N − 1
[ N∑
i=1
E[(S[i]n )
2]− 1
N
E[(Sn)
2]
]
=
1
N − 1
[ N∑
i=1
{Var(S[i]n ) + (E[S[i]n ])2} −
1
N
{Var(Sn) + (E[Sn])2}
]
=
1
N − 1
[
NVar(S[1]n )−
1
N
Var(Sn)
]
∼ n 1
N − 1
[
N(σ(1,N))2 − 1
N
[N(σ(1,N))2 +N(N − 1)σ([1,2],N)]
]
= n[(σ(1,N))2 − σ([1,2],N)]
as n→∞, hence
lim
n→∞
n−1E[(σˆ(N))2n] = (σ
(1,N))2 − σ([1,2],N).
We have omitted subscripts A′, B, (γ, 1−γ), and [r, s] because we want to apply
this formula in all cases.
Let us first consider the random-mixture case with ρ arbitrary. With γ = 1/2
we have
(σ
(1,N)
(1/2,1/2))
2 − σ([1,2],N)(1/2,1/2)
∼ 27(97 + 606ρ+ 1926ρ2 + 4262ρ3 + 7284ρ4 + 9894ρ5 + 10911ρ6
+ 9894ρ7 + 7284ρ8 + 4262ρ9 + 1926ρ10 + 606ρ11 + 97ρ12)
/[2N(10 + 20ρ+ 21ρ2 + 20ρ3 + 10ρ4)3] (26)
as N → ∞, which is (12) with γ = 1/2. With γ = 0 (only game B is played)
we have
(σ
(1,N)
B )
2 − σ([1,2],N)B =
(
3ρ
1 + ρ+ ρ2
)2
1
N
.
Finally, with γ = 1 (only game A′ is played) we have
(σ
(1,N)
A′ )
2 − σ([1,2],N)A′ =
2
N − 1 ∼
2
N
.
As Toral found, the result for the mixed game lies between those for games
A′ and B, and this is true regardless of ρ > 0. (Our results are not directly
comparable to his because we have taken the bias parameter ε to be 0.)
Finally, let us consider the nonrandom pattern [1, 1]. We find that (σ
(1,N)
[1,1] )
2−
σ
([1,2],N)
[1,1] has the same asymptotic value as in (26), so we have another coinci-
dence. It appears that these expected sample variances have essentially the
same property that the means enjoy, namely that their asymptotic value for the
23
case of the nonrandom pattern [r, s] depends only on r/(r+s) and ρ and is equal
to the asymptotic value for the case of the random mixture with γ = r/(r + s).
We have confirmed this in the six cases r, s ≥ 1 and r + s ≤ 4, but a proof for
all integers r, s ≥ 1 seems difficult.
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